July 18, 2005
The Honorable
Anthony J. Principi
Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark
Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202
Dear Chairman
Principi,
The State of Hawaii submits this memorandum
in support of the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, submitted to the
2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on May 13, 2005, to
maintain Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard as an active shipyard.
On May 13, 2005, under the authority of the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (DBCRA), the Secretary of
Defense issued the Department of Defense’s recommendations for closure and
realignment of military installations inside the United States for the 2005
round of Defense Base Closures and Realignments (BRAC 2005). This is the fifth round of closures and
realignments since 1988, with the previous rounds occurring in 1988, 1991,
1993, and 1995.
In particular, the Secretary recommended
the closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, adjacent to
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and relocation of the ship depot repair function to
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate
Maintenance Facility, and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. This recommendation “retains one nuclear-capable shipyard on each coast,” (Norfolk
and Puget Sound) and “sufficient
shipyard capacity to support forward
deployed assets” (Pearl Harbor). The
Secretary’s recommendations also stated that: “Naval Shipyard Portsmouth was
selected for closure, rather than Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, because it is
the only closure which could both eliminate excess capacity and satisfy
retention of strategically-placed shipyard capability. Planned force structure and force
positioning adjustments reflected in the 20-year Force Structure Plan led to
the selection of Naval
Shipyard Portsmouth
as the preferred closure candidate between the two sites. Additional savings, not included in the
payback analysis, are anticipated from reduced unit costs at the receiving
shipyards because of the higher volume of work.” The recommendations also stated that: “Naval Shipyard Portsmouth
had a low military value compared to operational homeports, and, its berthing
capacity is not required to support the Force Structure Plan. Therefore, closure of Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth is justified.”
On July 1, 2005, the Chairman of the 2005
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission wrote to the Secretary of
Defense, seeking explanations why certain installations, including Pearl Harbor
Naval Shipyard, were not included on the May 13, 2005, list. In particular, the Chairman of the 2005 BRAC
Commission asked why the Secretary did not recommend that Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard be closed and the ship depot repair functions there be realigned to
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard. The stated grounds for the
Chairman’s question were that: (1) the Department of the Navy has “sufficient
excess capacity” among its four
shipyards to close either Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard or Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard; (2) Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard “is less efficient” than Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard “according to Department of Navy data;” (3) “additional savings
could be found from reduced unit costs at the receiving shipyards because of a
higher volume of work;” and (4) Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard “has low military
value compared to other shipyards according to DoD analysis supporting the
recommendation to close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth.”
The Criteria applied by the Secretary of
Defense in making recommendations to close and realign military installations
in BRAC 2005 are set forth in Section 2913 of DBCRA. Section 2903(d)(2)(B) of the statute provides that the BRAC
Commission may not change any of the Secretary’s recommendations unless the
Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the Force
Structure Plan and the Criteria in making his recommendations.
The Criteria assign priority to the
Military Value of an installation over considerations regarding the return on
investment to be achieved from closing an installation; the economic impact of
closure on the local community where the installation is located; the ability of
the infrastructure at the existing and potential receiving communities to
support forces, mission and personnel; and the environmental impact of closure,
including costs arising out of environmental restoration and compliance
activities.
The Criteria in Section 2913(b) of DBCRA
set forth four components of Military Value: (1) current and future mission
capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the
Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training and
readiness; (2) the availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both
existing and potential receiving locations; (3) the ability to accommodate
contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both
existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training;
and (4) the cost of operations and the manpower implications.
This memorandum will demonstrate that the
Secretary of Defense’s recommendation to maintain Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
as an active depot-level, nuclear-capable repair and overhaul activity more
than satisfies the DBCRA Criteria and is completely consistent with the Force
Structure Plan. Indeed, his
recommendation recognizes the central strategic role that Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard plays in the defense of this Nation, and, thus, its unparalleled
military value.
First, the current and future mission
capabilities and the operational readiness of the Pacific Fleet depend upon the
full-service Naval Shipyard at Pearl Harbor.
Both the Commander of the Pacific Command and the Commander of the
Pacific Fleet explicitly affirmed this importance in recent correspondence to
Senator Daniel K. Inouye, dated July 11, 2005 and July 8, 2005,
respectively. The Secretary of the Navy
and Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense cited the Shipyard’s paramount
importance in his letter to the Chairman of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission, dated July 14, 2005.
Second, the Naval Shipyard at Pearl Harbor is a large facility with
extensive infrastructure, such as five Drydocks that can accommodate Cruisers,
Destroyers, Frigates, large Amphibious Ships and Aircraft Carriers as well as
Attack Submarines and Piers that can accommodate a nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier. Third, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard has
substantial capacity to respond to surge requirements because of its extensive
infrastructure and diverse workload and product lines. Fourth, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s
mid-Pacific location allows Navy ships homeported at Pearl Harbor to stay there
for overhauls and repairs, rather than deploying to mainland shipyards with all
of the attendant operational, economic and social costs; and it provides a
full-service maintenance and repair yard for Navy ships operating in the
Pacific. This location obviates the
need for expensive and time-consuming transits to Naval Shipyards on the West
Coast and the East Coast that would reduce the amount of time each ship is
available to operate as a Fleet unit.
An equally important consideration is
avoiding the need for Sailors to leave their homeport, and their families, or
to relocate their families for ship maintenance and overhaul periods on the
mainland. These dedicated men and
women, who voluntarily choose to serve our Nation, should not suffer such
unneeded disruptions to their lives.
BACKGROUND
The Secretary of Defense’s 2005
recommendations concerning Department of the Navy bases and activities follow
in the wake of the course set by Secretaries of Defense who developed closure
and realignment recommendations in the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds of
Defense Base Closures and Realignments.
These rounds were driven by the dramatic changes that flowed from the
end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, specifically the
substantial reductions in force structure and the absence of a major adversary
that could threaten America.
Thus, taking into account the substantial
reductions in the Navy’s force structure, i.e., ships, aircraft and
personnel, the Department of Defense recommended the closure of many Naval
Stations, Naval Air Stations, Naval Shipyards, and Naval Air Depots on both
coasts and in the Pacific during the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds. These included the Naval Stations in New
York, Philadelphia, Charleston, Mobile, Seattle, San Francisco, and Long Beach;
the Naval Air Stations at Cecil Field near Jacksonville, Florida, Glenview,
Illinois, near Chicago, Barbers Point on Oahu, near Honolulu, Adak Island in
the Aleutians, Midway Island in the Pacific, and Agana in the Territory of
Guam. These recommendations also
included the Naval Shipyards in Philadelphia, Charleston, Mare Island (Vallejo,
California), and Long Beach, California.
And these recommendations included the Naval Air Depots at Norfolk,
Virginia, Pensacola, Florida, and Alameda, California. All of these recommendations were accepted
by the previous Commissions, and these bases and activities were closed during
the 1990’s.
The May 13, 2005, recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense once again reflect the shrinking force structure of the
Navy and the shifting source of threats to America’s national security. These recommendations expressly take into
account both the “planned force structure and force positioning adjustments
reflected in the 20-year Force Structure Plan” of March 2005. The adjustments project, for example, a
reduction of 21 per cent in the Navy’s Attack Submarine fleet and the
retirement of an Aircraft Carrier. See U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base
Closures and Realignments at 104-106 (July 2005). Despite this reduction in the Attack Submarine fleet, however,
the Navy plans to increase the number of Attack Submarines homeported in the
Pacific, including in Hawaii.
The
clear implication is that this planned increase in Submarine presence in the
Pacific region and the Secretary’s BRAC 2005 recommendations take into account
the emerging security threats in East Asia.
The immediate threats to our national security from this region are
those posed by North Korea and by terrorists from the Middle East who are
infiltrating the Philippines and Indonesia.
Additionally, a developing threat is evident in the large investment
that China is making in its military forces, particularly in its navy.
The consequence for our national strategy
is also clear. Admiral Vern Clark, the
Chief of Naval Operations, recognized these threats and spoke about their
impacts on the Navy at the July 8, 2005,
ceremony at Pearl Harbor, marking the
Change of Command for the Pacific Fleet.
During his remarks, Admiral Clark ordered the new Pacific Fleet
Commander to keep his ships facing west.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S ANALYSIS OF
MILITARY VALUE
The Secretary of Defense’s recommendations
were based upon the conclusion of the Department of the Navy and the Industrial
Joint Cross-Service Group that there is excess capacity across the four Naval
Shipyards at Portsmouth and Norfolk on
the East Coast, Puget Sound on the West Coast, and Pearl Harbor in the Pacific,
and their judgment that the Military Value of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is
higher than that of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Military Value has two components, and the
Department of Defense relied upon both in formulating its recommendations for
closure and realignment of military installations. The quantitative component is reflected in the commodity-based
counting of assets to calculate capacity.
The qualitative component is reflected in the application of military
judgment to the totality of circumstances, strategic as well as economic, that
bear on the decision to close or realign an installation.
In its quantitative analysis, the
Department of the Navy determined the Military Value of activities that perform
the Surface-Subsurface Operations function, consisting of 29
installations. Naval Station Pearl
Harbor, including Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance
Facility, ranked first with a Military Value score of 74.50. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard ranked fifteenth
with a Military Value score of 48.21.
As stated in Candidate Recommendation #DON-0133 Supporting Information,
Portsmouth’s Military Value score of 48.21 “was below the mean Military Value
score for all installations capable of performing the Surface-Subsurface
Operations Function (50.61) and well below the mean Military Value score of
‘active bases’ (55.64).”
The Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group
also calculated a Military Value score for each Naval Shipyard. In order, these scores were: Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard – 0.7480; Norfolk Naval Shipyard – 0.7339; Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard – 0.6444; and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard - 0.6208. Thus, Portsmouth
received a slightly higher quantitative Military Value score than Pearl Harbor.
However, after the Department of the Navy
and the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group calculated their respective
quantitative Military Value scores, they proceeded to the qualitative
evaluation of the shipyards. In this
part of the Military Value analysis, they applied military judgment to resolve
the excess capacity problem they saw across all four shipyards. The qualitative aspect of Military Value
favored Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard for strategic reasons and outweighed the
slightly higher quantitative score that Portsmouth had received from the
Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group.
Importantly, both the Department of the Navy and the Industrial Joint
Cross-Service Group agreed on the conclusion of the qualitative analysis that the
Military Value of Pearl Harbor exceeded that of Portsmouth.
When the Department of the Navy applied
military judgment to the excess capacity issue, it recommended closure of
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard because that was the only closure that would both
eliminate excess capacity and retain strategically located shipyard
capability. In reaching this judgment,
the Department of the Navy took into account planned adjustments in both force
structure and the positioning of forces that were contained in the 20-year
Force Structure Plan. The Navy also
recognized that this recommendation would retain “sufficient shipyard capacity
to support forward deployed assets.”
Finally, the Navy noted that “Naval Shipyard Portsmouth had a low
military value compared to operational homeports, and its berthing capacity is
not required to support the Force Structure Plan.” See Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Report, Vol. I, Part 2 of 2 at DoN-23, 24, and Candidate Recommendation
#DON-0133 and Supporting Information.
When the Industrial Joint Cross-Service
Group applied military judgment to resolve the excess capacity issue, it
reached the same conclusion as the Department of the Navy. “It was the military judgment of the Industrial
Joint Cross-Service Group that closing NSYD Portsmouth provides the highest
overall military value to the Department.”
As the Department of the Navy
explained in Candidate Recommendation #DON-0133, “NSYD Portsmouth was selected
for closure, rather than NSYD Pearl Harbor, because it is the only closure
which could eliminate excess capacity and satisfy Navy desires to strive to
place ship maintenance capabilities close to the Fleet to: dry dock CVN’s and
submarines on both coasts and in the Central Pacific; refuel/defuel/ inactivate
nuclear-powered ships; and dispose of inactivated nuclear-powered ship reactor
compartments.”
Thus,
despite the slightly higher quantitative Military Value score that it received
from the IJCSG, Portsmouth was selected
for closure, because the Department of Defense’s analysis of the qualitative
component of Military Value looked beyond the commodity-based counting of
assets and subsequent calculation of a Military Value score. The Department applied military judgment to
the totality of circumstances, including strategic considerations, that bear on
the decision whether to close or realign an installation. This examination clearly revealed Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard’s crucial role in America’s national security and,
therefore, its very high Military Value.
Thus,
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard did not have a “low military value compared to
other shipyards,” as suggested by the attachment to the Commission’s letter to
the Secretary of Defense dated July 1, 2005.
As set forth in the correspondence dated July 14, 2005, from the
Secretary of the Navy and Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of
the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission:
“Although the quantitative military value
score
for
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard was slightly lower than that of Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, it was the military judgment of the Industrial JCSG that Pearl Harbor
Naval Shipyard’s critical geographical location, adjacent to a significant
portion of the Fleet and forward positioned in the central Pacific, combined
with its capability to dock a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, provided a
higher overall military value to the Department. This judgment is supported by the DON, as indicated by its
submission of the closure recommendation.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is strategically located to support DoD’s
current and future mission capabilities in the Pacific. Loss of this critical asset will have an
adverse impact on operational warfighting capability, training and
readiness. Additionally the Combatant
Commander expressed operational concerns with a closure of the Pearl Harbor
Shipyard in that it would result in reduced theater presence as a result of the
associated increased transit times, a loss of emergent CVN drydock capability (the
only option west of Washington state) and a general concern with the loss of
availability of ‘logistics, supply and operational support services throughout
the Pacific.’ Finally, the Navy was
concerned with the personnel retention implications that would result from a
closure of Pearl Harbor in that it would result in a significant increase in
dockings being conducted out of homeport.”
These considerations
will be discussed more fully below.
PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD’S MILITARY VALUE
The Pearl Harbor Naval Complex on the
island of Oahu is central to America’s ability to project force in the Pacific;
to sustain that force; and to repair, refuel and rebuild components of that
force when they return to their
homeport. This Complex consists
of three principal components: Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Fleet and Industrial
Supply Center Pearl Harbor, and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. These three activities enable the United
States to project, sustain and maintain a strong and reliable military presence
in the Pacific, where the tyranny of distance and warm water impose extreme
demands on the hulls of Navy ships as well as their propulsion, mechanical and
electronic systems. There are 17 Los
Angeles Class Attack Submarines (SSN 688 Class) and 12 Cruisers, Destroyers and
Frigates homeported at the Naval Station, adjacent to the Shipyard. Additionally, the new Virginia Class
Submarine, USS Hawaii, will likely be homeported at Naval Station Pearl Harbor.
The Pacific Fleet’s Area Of Responsibility
covers 100 million miles in the Pacific, Indian and Arctic Oceans from the West
Coast of the United States to the East Coast of Africa. Located in the middle of the Pacific Ocean,
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is six days ship transit time from the West Coast
of the United States, nine days ship transit time from the Territory of Guam,
and sixteen days ship transit time from Singapore.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and
Intermediate Maintenance Facility cover 112 acres at the Pearl Harbor Naval
Complex. There are 114 buildings and
structures, five graving drydocks, more than 20 piers, 10 portal cranes, and
one floater crane with a capacity of 224,000 pounds at the Shipyard. The drydocks are capable of accommodating
Submarines, Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates,
all large Amphibious Ships, and Aircraft Carriers, and the piers can
accommodate a nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier.
About
5,100 personnel, consisting of 4,300 civilians and 800 military personnel, work
at the Shipyard. The Shipyard and
Intermediate Maintenance Facility are the State of Hawaii’s largest industrial
employers and they have an economic impact on the State that is exceeded only
by tourism. As in other Naval Shipyard
communities on the mainland, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard has developed a
tradition of producing skilled artisans generation after generation.
The workload at Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard, reflected in its various product lines and CNO-directed priorities,
responds to the national security requirement to project, sustain and maintain
a Pacific Fleet that is capable of meeting, deterring and defeating America’s
adversaries in East Asia. Thus, Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard is a full-service, nuclear-capable Naval Shipyard that
maintains, repairs and overhauls Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates and Submarines
and can accommodate an Aircraft Carrier at its piers and in Drydock No. 4.
The
Naval Shipyard at Pearl Harbor performs scheduled overhaul and maintenance for
Attack Submarines and Surface Combatant ships as assigned by the Chief of Naval
Operations. It also performs emergent
repair and maintenance services for the operational Attack Submarines and
Surface Combatant Ships homeported at Naval Station Pearl Harbor and for the
three Attack Submarines based at Naval Activities Guam. Additionally, the Shipyard maintains and repairs non-combatant ships
and provides voyage repair services to Trident Submarines and other Navy ships
transiting the Pacific and to ships of foreign navies that are operating in the
Hawaii-Pacific area.
In particular, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
performs depot-level overhauls on Attack Submarines, Cruisers, Destroyers and
Frigates and it performs nuclear submarine refueling overhauls on Attack
Submarines. Its Intermediate
Maintenance Facility provides repair, maintenance and modernization services
for all Navy ships. Emergent repairs
are conducted at the Intermediate Maintenance Facility, at the Shipyard, and at
Navy facilities in Guam, Yokosuka and Bahrain.
The
Shipyard’s product lines consist of Fleet Maintenance Scheduled by the Chief of
Naval Operations, such as Defueling and Refueling SSN 688 Class Submarines;
Other Fleet Maintenance, including Regional Nuclear Maintenance; and Component
Repairs, such as Propeller Shaft repairs.
About 43 per cent of the Shipyard’s annual workload consists of Fleet
Maintenance Availabilities composed of about 40 Submarine Upkeeps and 38
Surface Ship Upkeeps. About 33 per cent
of the Shipyard’s workload is focused on Engineered Refueling Overhauls on
Attack Submarines at the rate of about one each year. The remaining workload, 24 per cent, consists of Selected
Restricted Availabilities for at least four ships each year.
Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard has a distinctive workload as a result of the substantial emergent and voyage repair
demands that Navy ships homeported in the Pacific and operating in the Pacific
place on it. An instruction from the
Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAVINST 4700.1K, established the priority of work
at Naval Shipyards. The first priority
is given to Trident Submarines that visit
shipyards in transit to and from patrols. Second, Naval Shipyards must perform voyage repairs to Navy ships
that have, for example, sustained damage or experienced mechanical malfunction
of equipment while at sea. Third, Naval
Shipyards must work on ships that are preparing for deployment. Only after these priorities have been
satisfied may Naval Shipyards turn to CNO-scheduled depot-level maintenance on
ships assigned to them for maintenance and restricted availabilities.
Because
there are 17 Attack Submarines and 12 Surface Combatant Ships homeported at
Naval Station Pearl Harbor and 3 Attack Submarines based in Guam, and because
other Navy ships operating in the Pacific visit Pearl Harbor regularly, Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard must constantly respond to their emergent and voyage
repair needs before performing scheduled shipyard availability work. None of the other Naval Shipyards face a
similar challenge, and the Department of Defense recognized this distinction
during its BRAC 2005 deliberations when it acknowledged the frequent
realignment of workload priorities at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard resulting
from operational decisions affecting the Pacific theater.
Importantly,
performing this work at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard means that the 17 Attack
Submarines and 12 Surface Combatant Ships homeported at Naval Station Pearl
Harbor will not incur the operational, maintenance and family quality of life
costs that would otherwise be generated if they had to deploy to mainland
shipyards for availabilities. In light
of the current personnel tempo of operations for shipboard Sailors and
Officers, known as “PERSTEMPO”, this is no small consideration.
THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION’S INQUIRY
The 2005 BRAC Commission’s inquiry, as set
forth in the attachment to the Chairman’s letter to the Secretary of Defense
dated July 1, 2005, suggests that the Department of Defense made a choice
between two similar industrial activities when it recommended the closure of Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, but that is not the case.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard are very
different activities that are not comparable to each other.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard are situated in very different places, separated by nearly six
thousand miles, a continent, and the world’s largest ocean. As a result, these two Naval Shipyards
operate in very different environments.
For example, Pearl Harbor must respond to conditions that sub-tropical
and tropical climates impose on Navy ships, such as the unique effects that
warm water has on all Navy ships, but particularly on SSN 688 Class Attack
Submarines. Warm water causes corrosion
and introduces sea growth on hulls and into valves and piping systems that is
not experienced by ships operating in cold waters like the Atlantic Ocean. For example, valves on ships operating in
the Pacific must be opened and inspected for sea growth and corrosion, as must
be the piping. Thus, the Navy
explicitly prescribes an increased number of man-day’s to be allotted for this
work during Selected Restricted Availabilities for vessels operating in this
theater.
These two Naval Shipyards have very
different workloads and product lines.
Pearl Harbor is a full-service shipyard that overhauls, maintains and
repairs Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates
and Amphibious Ships as well as Attack Submarines, while Portsmouth’s workload
is restricted to Attack Submarines.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard has extensive
infrastructure that includes five drydocks (one of which can accommodate an
Aircraft Carrier) and piers that can accommodate a nuclear-powered Aircraft
Carrier. Its harbor can accommodate Aircraft Carriers. Portsmouth, by comparison, uses two drydocks
for Attack Submarine work and has one other small drydock. None of Portsmouth’s drydocks can easily
accommodate modern large combatant ships.
Additionally, its harbor cannot accommodate Aircraft Carriers.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s extensive
infrastructure endows it with substantial, demonstrated and diverse surge
capability to respond to an increase in national security requirements. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard’s surge capability
is limited to Submarines.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard responds to the
emergent needs of the operational Attack Submarines and Surface Combatant Ships
that are homeported at Naval Station Pearl Harbor and at Naval Activities Guam
as well as performing depot-level work on ships assigned to the Shipyard for
scheduled maintenance and overhaul periods.
There are no Navy ships homeported at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is co-located
in a natural, deep-water harbor with a Naval Station that is of paramount
importance to the national security of the United States, reflected in the 17
Attack Submarines and 12 Cruisers, Destroyers and Frigates that are homeported
at Naval Station Pearl Harbor. This
harbor, the Naval Station, and the Shipyard’s facilities can accommodate a
nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier.
Portsmouth has neither a harbor nor a pier capable of receiving an
Aircraft Carrier; its drydock
capabilities are limited; and Portsmouth is not co-located with a Naval
Station.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s geographic
location places it squarely in the center of the region that presents the most
likely threats to America’s security for the foreseeable future. Thus, its strategic importance to the
Pacific Fleet and the Nation is crucial.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s location in
the middle of the Pacific Ocean does guarantee that, economically, some of its
costs will be higher than those typically encountered in Maine and New
Hampshire, such as the cost of fuel, the cost of housing, and similar cost of
living indicators. This has always been
the case, but America’s national security has always justified these marginal
costs. Moreover, these costs are offset
by the cost savings effects of the Shipyard’s mid-ocean location, because
moving ships around is an expensive proposition. With Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard available, Navy ships operating in the Pacific are not required
to transit to Naval Shipyards on the West Coast or the East Coast for overhaul
and repairs; they can conveniently accomplish this work in their Pacific
operating area.
These distinctions are not intended to be
critical of the excellent work that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard performs for the
Navy or to minimize its contribution to the national security of the United
States. Rather, they are intended to
point out the very different missions, operations and capabilities of the two
shipyards.
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is not a
substitute for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, nor is a combination of Portsmouth,
Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards a substitute for Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard. None of these Naval Shipyards
is strategically located in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, able to sustain
and maintain America’s forward-deployed Pacific Fleet in the vast region that
presents the greatest threats to our national security for the foreseeable
future.
The United States Government Accountability
Office summarized parts of DoD’s
rationale for recommending the closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard rather than
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard at page 107 of its Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection
Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments:
“In
selecting Portsmouth over Pearl Harbor for closure, the Navy noted that Pearl
Harbor is in a fleet concentration area in the Pacific theater and is the
homeport for many ships, while Portsmouth is not in a fleet concentration area
or a homeport for any ships. In
addition, closing Pearl Harbor would require the ships that are homeported
there to transit back to the east coast, in some cases, for maintenance, which the
Navy would essentially view as a deployment and, for quality of life reasons,
would want to avoid if possible.
Another strategic objective was to maintain dry docks for aircraft
carriers on both coasts and in the Central Pacific. Pearl Harbor has aircraft dry-docking capability, but Portsmouth
does not.”
Quality of life
costs are not incorporated in the commodity-based calculation of capacity, but
they are very important considerations for the Fleet, because they directly
affect the personal lives of the men and women who choose to serve in the
United States Navy.
CONCLUSION
America’s
most militarily capable adversaries for the foreseeable future will be in the
Pacific region, where maritime presence, operations and engagement
dominate. As a result, Hawaii and Guam
will play increasingly important roles in America’s national strategy by
responding to national security requirements that demand the projection,
sustainment and repair of Naval forces engaged in the Pacific region. The only Naval Ship Repair Facility west of
Hawaii is located in Yokosuka, Japan, a sixteen-day ship transit time from the
West Coast of the United States. Thus,
for all the reasons discussed in this memorandum, it is clear beyond any doubt
that Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is vital to our national security now and will
be even more crucial in the increasingly dangerous future.
The
Department of Defense faithfully applied the Criteria set forth in DBCRA and
properly considered the Force Structure Plan in its analysis of Naval
Shipyards. The 2005 Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission should accept these recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense and maintain Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard as the vital,
full-service, nuclear-capable Naval Shipyard it is today, to allow our Nation
to face the military challenges of the future in the Pacific region.
/s/
LINDA LINGLE